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Abstract
The proposed scheme provides universal verifiability to the blind-signcryptext
with full message recovery at the end of the intended receiver. Based on
a three entity model, the signcryptor, the requester and the receiver, the
scheme also provides traceability and non-repudiation along with unforge-
ability of the parameters.
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1Introduction
1.1 Blind Signature
The concept of Blind Signature (1) came earlier in 1982 to allow a user to produce
signature over a message, without revealing the original message to the Signer and
maintain the anonymity of participants. Since then it has found a popular use in
secure payment systems etc.
1.1.1 Introduction to Blind Signature
Blind Signature is a digital signature scheme where the original message is disguised
from the signer of the message as the signing entity is different from the author of
the message and the un-blinded message can be universally verified by anyone like any
other digital signature schemes.
It is required generally in the three-party model where the signer is a third party
and the message being exchanged between the author of the message and the intended
receiver is sensitive enough to be hidden from the third party or if the sender and
receiver choose not to trust the third party completely with the original content of the
message being exchanged.
1.1.2 How it works
1. Suppose Alice wants Bob to sign a message m, but does not want Bob to know
the contents of the message.
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2. Alice ”blinds” the message m, with some random number b (the blinding factor).
This results in blind(m,b).
3. Bob signs this message, resulting in sign(blind(m,b),d), where d is Bob’s private
key.
4. Alice then unblinds the message using b, resulting in unblind(sign(blind(m,b),d),b).
5. The functions are designed so that this reduces to sign(m,d), i.e. Bob’s signature
on m.
1.1.3 Blind RSA Signature
One of the simplest blind signature schemes is based on RSA signing. Here are the
steps:
1. Assume e is the public RSA exponent, d is the secret RSA exponent and N is the
RSA modulus.
2. Select random value r, such that r is relatively prime to N (i.e. gcd(r,N) = 1).
3. r is raised to the public exponent e modulo N .
4. remodN is used as a blinding factor.
5. Because r is a random value, remodN is random too.
6. The author of the message computes the product of the message and blinding
factor, i.e.
m′ ≡ mre (mod N)
7. And sends the resulting value m′ to the signing authority. Because r is a random
value and the mapping r 7→ re mod N is a permutation it follows that re mod N
is random too. This implies that m′ does not leak any information about m. The
signing authority then calculates the blinded signature s′ as:
s′ ≡ (m′)d (mod N)
2
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8. s′ is sent back to the author of the message, who can then remove the blinding
factor to reveal s, the valid RSA signature of m:
s ≡ s′ · r−1 (mod N)
9. This works because RSA keys satisfy the equation red ≡ r (mod N) and thus
s ≡ s′ · r−1 ≡ (m′)dr−1 ≡ mdredr−1 ≡ mdrr−1 ≡ md (mod N),
hence s is indeed the signature of m.
1.1.4 Uses of Blind Signature
Blind signature schemes see a great deal of use in applications where sender privacy is
important. This includes various ”digital cash” schemes and voting protocols.
For example, the integrity of some electronic voting system may require that each
ballot be certified by an election authority before it can be accepted for counting; this
allows the authority to check the credentials of the voter to ensure that they are allowed
to vote, and that they are not submitting more than one ballot. Simultaneously, it is
important that this authority does not learn the voter’s selections. An unlinkable blind
signature provides this guarantee, as the authority will not see the contents of any ballot
it signs, and will be unable to link the blinded ballots it signs back to the un-blinded
ballots it receives for counting.
1.2 Signcryption
Signcryption (2) was introduced in 1997 to bring down the cost of encryption and
signature of the message by implementing both in one single step unlike encrypt-then-
sign and sign-then-encrypt schemes where it took two separate steps for the same.
1.2.1 Introduction to Signcryption
To avoid forgery and ensure the confidentiality of a letter, it is a common practice for
the originator of the letter to sign it and then seal the signed letter in an envelope.
The same two-step approach can be adapted to the digital world where the originator
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of a digital message can ensure the unforgeability and confidentiality of the message
by signing the message using a digital signature algorithm followed by encrypting the
digitally signed message using a public key encryption algorithm.
Cryptographic operations for signature and encryption are relatively expensive as
they typically involve computations on astronomically large numbers and generate ad-
ditional communication overhead. With the ”digital signature followed by public key
encryption” method described above, the computational and communication overhead
for achieving unforgeability and confidentiality is the sum of the overhead for digital
signature and that for public key encryption.
Signcryption is a public key cryptographic method that achieves unforgeability and
confidentiality simultaneously with significantly smaller overhead than that required
by ”digital signature followed by public key encryption”. It does this by signing and
encrypting a message in a single step, fulfilling a cryptographer’s dream to ” kill two
birds with one stone ”.
1.3 Related Work
There has been some work done on Blind Signcryption in recent past (3, 4) including
Blind identity based signcryption (5), but nothing considerable has been achieved yet
in the topic and is expected to grow with number of literatures to come as large volume
of work is being done for the same.
Apart from that the Blind signature schemes and Signcryption schemes are relatively
long existing and huge amount of literature with a good success rate has been written
and is available for reference. Combining the two provides greater security than any
one used alone. The basic idea behind the concept is to bring down the computational
cost as well. As, in blind signature, the actual transaction is of signature only, pro-
viding authenticity to the sender. Any encryption of the message, if required, is done
separately. While in blind signcryption, a sender can also encrypt the message in the
same step along with signature and thus providing higher security at relatively lower
computational cost.
4
2Objective of the project
2.1 Final aim
Here in this paper we have tried to work with the combination of above stated two
strategies to implement a Blind Signcryption scheme which is universally verifiable.
The proposed scheme consists of three participants, namely, Signcryptor, Requester
and Verifier. This whole scheme is a five phase process- Key Generation, Blinding,
Signcryption, Unblinding and Verification. We will discuss about the scheme in detail in
further sections. Our ultimate goal is to design an effective scheme which can further be
implemented in various applications. We will start with designing a blind signcryption
scheme without bilinear pairing as most of the previous work that has been done is based
on Identity based encryption and involves bilinear pairing and very less or relatively
no amount of related work is done on DLP based scheme.
Once done with that we will move further to find applications whose computation cost
can be improved by implementing our scheme and in process making desired changes
in the scheme based on requirements of the application.
5
2. OBJECTIVE OF THE PROJECT
6
3Proposed Scheme
3.1 Phases of proposed scheme
The proposed scheme goes through five phases overall during the whole communication.
The Signcryptor performs Key Generation after which the requestor interacts with the
Signcryptor to perform Blinding. Signcryptor then signcrypts the message and sends
it to the requestor, who then un-blinds the message received and then authenticity of
received message is verified. Let us now describe the whole scheme in detail at each
phase.
3.1.1 Key Generation
Key generation is the first phase of the scheme, where the public/private key pair is
generated by the Signcryptor. The operations of this phase are described as follows.
1. The Signcryptor chooses two large primes p1 & p2 in random and computes n =
p1p2. Then he computes p = 2n+ 1 , such that p is a prime.
2. The Signcryptor chooses g as a generator in Zp
∗ and H as a secure hash algorithm.
E and D are publicly known encryption and decryption algorithm.
3. The Signcryptor chooses his private key-pair (x, r) in random and computes y
and h as follows,
h = grmodp (3.1)
y = gxmodp (3.2)
7
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The public key of Signcryptor is y. Then the Signcryptor sends h to the requester in a
secure way and publishes the systems public parameters param = (g, p,H, y, E,D).
Meanwhile, every verifier/intended receiver is assumed to have private/public key
pair as < xV , yV > and the requester as < xR, yR > where yi = g
ximodp.
3.1.2 Blinding
The requester chooses his secret parameters (α, β, ω) in random and computes,
K = gωxRmodp (3.3)
C = EK(m) (3.4)
r1 = H(K) (3.5)
µ1 = H(hg
αyβ)modp (3.6)
µ2 = (µ1 + β)modp (3.7)
Then he sends the blinded message (µ2, r1, C) to the signcryptor.
3.1.3 Signcryption
After receiving (µ2, r1, C), the signcryptor produces the signcrypted text Z as follows
and sends it to the requester.
Z = (r + µ2x)modp (3.8)
3.1.4 Unblinding
1. After receiving Z, the requester computes
Z ′ = (Z + α+ ωxR)modp (3.9)
2. Requester uses the public key of intended verifier/receiver to compute
C ′ = (C + yV ωxR)modp (3.10)
3. The blind signcrypted text on message m is
σ = (Z ′, µ1,K, r1, C ′) (3.11)
8
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3.1.5 Verification and Message Recovery
1. When a receiver obtains σ, he verifies authenticity of the received message as per
following two conditions,
r? = H(K) (3.12)
H(gZ
′
y−µ1K−1)modp = µ1modp (3.13)
2. If the above two expressions are satisfied, the blind signcryption is assumed to be
a valid one, otherwise it is rejected.
3. Then the receiver recovers message m as follows
m = DK(C
′ −KxVmodp) (3.14)
3.2 Proof of Correctness
This sections gives a formal proof of the verification equation (3.13) and its correctness.
H(gZ
′
y−µ1K−1)modp
= H(gZ+α+ωxRy−µ1K−1)modp
= H(gZgαgωxRy−µ1K−1)modp
= H(gr+µ2xgαgωxRy−µ1K−1)modp
= H(hg(µ1+β)xgαgωxRy−µ1K−1)modp
= H(hgµ1xgβxgαKy−µ1K−1)modp
= H(hyβgα)modp
= µ1modp
3.3 Security Analysis
Here in this section we are discussing about the security of the proposed scheme. Al-
though many are similar to the security analysis of underlying schemes in their respec-
tive original papers on Signcryption and Blind Signature, we have pointed out some of
the most important security aspects.
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3.3.1 Blinding
In blind signcryption, perfect blinding is of most importance so that the Signer should
not be able to see the message and anonymity of the participants is maintained. The
Signcryptor receives blinded message (µ2, r1, C) and produces Signcrypted text over it
and hence he has no access to the original message.
3.3.2 Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the sole interest of all the cryptology schemes and should be satisfied
by all. This scheme satisfies confidentiality and is only compromised when the private
key of the intended verifier/receiver xV is no longer confidential, which is assumed to
be impossible.
1. Required equation for message recovery is,
m = DK(C
′ −KxVmodp)
2. Now,KxVmodp = gωxRxVmodp , which cannot be solved even if K and yV are
known separately, as it is Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem and no polynomial
time probabilistic algorithm solves DDHP with non-negligible probability.
3.3.3 Unforgeability
We have three entities here who can try to forge the blind-signcryptext lets name them
as S (Malicious Signcryptor), R (Malicious Requester) and V (Malicious Verifier). Let
us verify them one by one.
1. If S tries to forge the blind-signcryptext:
It can produce forged secret parameters (α′, β′, ω′) but to forge the key K it needs
to know the secret key xR of the requester, which is considered impossible and
it cannot forge xR as the public key yR of the requester has been already made
public and knowing the public key one cannot forge a corresponding private key
of any user as it requires solving discrete logarithm which is hard.
2. If R tries to forge the blind-signcryptext:
Any malicious requester can imitate as someone else to try to forge the required
10
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blind-signcryptext by involving with Signcryptor as man-in-the-middle, but for
that the adversary R will have to produce a private key corresponding to the
public key of the genuine Requester, but it is considered as hard problem and
thus, even the adversary R cannot forge parameters like K and others which
involves the private key of the genuine Requester.
3. If V tries to forge the blind-signcryptext:
An intended receiver can forge the blind-signcryptext as it has ways to regenerate
all the parameters required and can forge a blind-signcryptext claiming as it being
received from the Requester.
3.3.4 Universal Verifiability
The scheme is universal verifiable as all the parameters required for verification are
sent to the receiver at once. Anyone having that blind-signcryptext can verify the
authenticity of the message using equations (3.12) and (3.13).
3.3.5 Traceability and non-repudiation
A valid requester can always prove his authenticity by publishing his secret key xR and
secret parameter ω and thus using the formula,
K = gωxRmodp, If the parameters satisfy this equation then the user is considered
legal.
For more security analysis, original (6, 7) schemes can be referred.
11
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4Implementation results
The proposed scheme was implemented in Java using security package and BigInteger
class. The snapshots of implementation results are provided in this chapter.
Figure 4.1: Phase 1: Key Generation - The figure shows various parameters generated
in the first phase of the scheme
13
4. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
Figure 4.2: Phase 2: Blinding - The figure shows various parameters generated in the
blinding phase of the scheme
Figure 4.3: Phase 3, 4 & 5: Signcryption, Unblinding and Verification & Mes-
sage recovery - The figure shows various parameters generated in the last three phases
of the scheme
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5E-voting
Election is a fundamental instrument of democracy that provides an official mechanism
for people to express their views to the government. Traditionally, the process of voting
is quite cumbersome because voter must come in person to vote. This problem results
in the low participation rate of voting. Vote-by-mail cancater for certain voters such
as those who live in sparsely populated areas and who work far away fromthe voting
centers. However, this method is time-consuming and cumbersome for the authority
to manage since it requires extra work to send, collect and count the ballots manually.
Electronic voting system or EVS can overcome those problems. EVS is expected to
make our modern social life more convenient, efficient and inexpensive. By using EVS
in national election, a voter can vote from his home or office.
EVS must meet security requirments such as confidentiality, integrity, authentica-
tion, and verifiability. This is becauseEVS is more vulnerable than traditional voting
due to the nature of digital processing of election data which can be easily manipulated,
hence may result in widespread fraud and corruption.
As an instance, we will be applying our scheme to e-voting. A simple e-voting entity
model has been described below in the Fig. 5.1 and it also describes how the entities
in the proposed scheme can act in the e-voting environment.
Basically there are three entities involved. Their definition and roles have been
described below:
15
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Figure 5.1: E-voting: A simple entity model - The figure shows entities in an e-voting
protocol and how entities in the proposed scheme can be used
16
1. Voter: A voter is a national resident who is eligible to vote according to National
Registration Database. A requester in the proposed scheme is equivalent to a
voter in the e-voting environment.
2. Candidate: A candidate is the one who is contesting the election. A candidate
has to be a legal voter in order to contest the election.
3. Validator: A validator can be a person who manages a particular e-booth and the
local voters falling under his group of voters will request for signature from him
and in return he will be providing validated ballets to the voters. A signcryptor
in the proposed scheme is equivalent to a validator in the e-voting environment.
4. Tallier and E-voting Management: E-voting management can consist of A Tal-
lier, Administrator and Registrar. Administrator of E-Voting is responsible in
setting the dates of registration and voting.Besides that, administrator registers
voter to become a candidate. Registrar server checks the users particulars with
the national registration database to determine the eligibility of a voter and his
precinct. A Tallier is the one responsible to validate the incoming ballets and
store it in the voting database.
Figure 5.2 provides a sample E-voting System Architecture (8) consisting of de-
scribed entities and the process of interaction among them.
17
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Figure 5.2: E-voting: Sample System Architecture -
18
6Conclusion and Future Work
Signcryption and Blind Signatures are both strong individually, with Signcryption pro-
viding confidentiality and authentication efficiently and Blind Signatures providing ef-
ficient anonymity of participants. Both combined makes the scheme even stronger
providing anonymity, authentication, confidentiality and unforgeability. The scheme
proposed above is more secure than normal signcryption schemes when it comes to
maintain the users anonymity during the transaction.
As the basic scheme now has been designed we will now try to modify it to increase
efficiency and security. Also our future work includes designing a multi-user scheme
without much increase in space or computation cost.
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